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Incentive regulation is designed to improve productive efficiency, enhance service quality
and consumer welfare, and reduce the costs of regulation. The issue that is considered here
is whether incentive regulation in the form of a price cap applicable to interstate access
service to local loops in the telecommunications industry in the United States has resulted
in an increase in the technical efficiency and allocative efficiency of local exchange carriers.
The results suggest that for changes in technical efficiency, there is a definite randomness
between 1985 and 1993 with technical efficiency increasing in some years and decreasing
in others. Subsequent to 1993, however, there is a consistent improvement in technical
efficiency. Given that incentive regulation in the form of price caps was implemented in
1991, it is likely that some portion of the improvement in technical efficiency subsequent
to 1993 is attributable to incentive regulation.
JEL classification codes: L1
Key words: allocative efficiency, incentive regulation, price caps, technical
efficiency, telecommunications
I. Introduction
An important regulatory tool in the telecommunications industry in the
* The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the policies
of the Federal Communications Commission or the views of other Federal Communications
staff members.164 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
United States is incentive regulation. A number of factors led away from
rate-of-return (cost-based) regulation and toward a regulatory approach that
ostensibly provides incentives for increasing productive efficiency thereby
allowing firms to share in the social gains from efficiency with increased
profits.
The basic structure of incentive regulation as it has most commonly been
adopted in the telecommunications industry in the United States is in the
form of price caps. The issue that will be explored below is whether, de facto,
price caps have resulted in an increase in productive efficiency. Before
exploring this issue, however, some background is needed.
II.  Background
For several decades, there has been substantial criticism of rate-of-return
regulation. From the initial formal analysis by Averch and Johnson (1962),
concerns have centered around the potential for inefficiencies. It was suggested
that a profit-maximizing firm under rate-of-return regulation fails to minimize
the cost of producing any observed level of output, that these productive
inefficiencies might be large, and that the firm might even build up its rate
base by selling competitive outputs at a price below marginal cost. Although
a number of questions have been raised over the years about the original
analysis, many of the basic concerns about rate-of-return regulation persist
(Kahn, 1970, and Sherman, 1985, 1992).
Despite the concern with the presence of inefficiencies under rate-of-return
regulation, it was not abandoned in the telecommunications industry until the
decade of the 1980s. The developments crucial to ushering in the era of
incentive regulation in telecommunications are discussed in the  Notice of
Inquiry in the Matter of Price Cap Performance Review for AT&T (7 FCC
Rcd No. 17). In this Notice of Inquiry (NOI), two factors are identified
including the increasing degree of competition and rapid changes in technology
in telecommunications markets as the rationale for adopting incentive
regulation:165 TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY, ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY
“The Commission began development of the AT&T Price Cap Plan in
1987, as part of a fundamental reappraisal of the rate regulation it applies
to telecommunications common carriers. The reappraisal was
precipitated by the changes that have swept the telecommunications
industry in the last few decades. ... Traditional "cost-plus" rate of return
regulation focuses on establishing a reasonable limit on the carrier's
profits. ... The limitations and drawbacks of such "cost-plus" regulation
include distorted incentives in capital investment, encouragement of
cost shifting when the carrier also participates in more competitive
markets, and little incentive to introduce new and innovative services.
The Federal Communications Commission has concluded in the past
that rate of return regulation does not encourage optimal efficiency.
Under traditional rate of return regulation, the carrier’s allowed profits
are computed from its total invested capital, whether or not the carrier
is using capital, labor, operational methods, and pricing in the most
efficient manner.  To maximize profits, the company has an incentive
to manipulate its inputs of labor and capital, without regard to efficiency,
and to adopt strategies and pricing based on what it expects the
regulatory agency might wish, not necessarily what best serves its
customers and society” (7 FCC Rcd No. 17, p. 5322).
Rate-of-return regulation, as noted previously, has been replaced by
incentive regulation in the telecommunications industry in the United States.
Incentive regulation has a number of desirable properties. These include
technical efficiency (i.e., short-run cost minimization), dynamic efficiency
(i.e., long-run cost minimization), enhanced service quality and consumer
welfare, and reduced costs of regulation.  Incentive regulation plans also often
have socially beneficial equity and redistributional properties. Thus, preserving
low basic local service rates is a common property of incentive plans. In
some situations, a precondition for earnings sharing or other departures from
strict rate-of-return regulation is a freeze on basic local service rates for the166 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
duration of the incentive plan.  Rate stability is a broader, but related, objective
of incentive regulation (Kridel et al., 1996). Additional desirable properties
suggested by Littlechild (1983), one of the earliest proponents of incentive
regulation, include the protection of consumers against monopoly, promotion
of competition, enhancement of innovation, and improvement of the
profitability of the regulated firm.
There has been considerable discussion of the extent to which these
beneficial objectives can be realized.  Some of this discussion has been at the
theoretical level.  For example, a comparison between innovation under rate-
of-return regulation and under incentive regulation is provided by Cabral and
Riodan (1989). Their results generally support the identifiable beneficial
properties of incentive regulation. With incentive regulation, Vogelsang (1988,
1991) demonstrates convergence to efficient prices (both access and usage)
under stationary cost and demand conditions while Brennan (1989) finds that
cost and demand change when this convergence does not occur.
With regard to the implementation of incentive regulation, a number of
practical concerns have been raised.  For example, Sappington (1980) argues
that incentive regulation introduces the potential for pure waste and involves
the purchase of inputs which have no productive value.  Kridel, Sappington,
and Weismen (1996), on the other hand, survey a number of empirical studies
that ostensibly provide evidence that productivity, infrastructure investment,
profit levels, and new service offerings have increased under incentive
regulation.  It appears, therefore, that the attainability of many of the desirable
properties of incentive regulation is an empirical issue.
III.  Incentive Regulation and Price Caps
Incentive regulation is typically defined as the implementation of rules
that encourage a regulated firm to achieve desired goals by granting some,
but not complete, discretion to the firm. Three aspects of this definition of
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specified before incentive regulation is designed. The properties of the best
incentive regulation plan will vary according to the goals the plan is designed
to achieve. Second, the regulated firm is granted some discretion under
incentive regulation. For example, while the firm may be rewarded for reducing
its operating costs, it is not told precisely how to reduce these costs. Third,
the regulator imposes some restrictions on relevant activities or outcomes
under incentive regulation (Baron, 1991, and Bernstein and Sappington, 1999).
One popular incentive regulation plan is the price cap plan. The central
idea behind price cap regulation is to control the prices charged by the regulated
firm, rather than its earnings. Essentially, price cap regulation plans require
the regulated firm’s average real prices to fall annually by a specified
percentage (Mitchell and Vogelsang, 1991). This percentage is nominally
referred to as the "X-factor" or the productivity offset.
In the case of incumbent local exchange carriers (LECs) regulated by the
Federal Communications Commission, a price cap index (PCI) for common
line interstate access and for traffic sensitive switched interstate access is
adjusted annually pursuant to the PCI relationship defined in the  Code of
Federal Regulations.
1  The PCI relationship consists of a measure of inflation,
in this case the Gross Domestic Product Price Index (GDP-PI), minus the X-
factor, plus or minus any permitted exogenous cost changes.
For LEC interstate access service, it has been argued in the Price Cap
Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers in 1995 (10 FCC Rcd at
9002) that applying price cap regulation allows the Federal Communications
Commission, as closely as possible, to replicate the effects of a competitive
market.
2 That is, competition should be the model for setting just and
reasonable LEC rates based on a PCI because “Effective competition
encourages firms to improve their productivity and introduce improved
1 Section 61.45 (b) of the Commission’s rules.
2 Note that all Federal Communications Commissions documents referred to are accessible
via the Federal Communications Commission’s web site http://www.fcc.gov.168 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
products and services, in order to increase their profits. With prices set by
marketplace forces, the most efficient firms will earn above-average profits,
while less efficient firms will earn lower profits, or cease operating. Over
time, the benefits of competition flow to customers and to society, in the form
of prices that reflect costs, maximize social welfare, and efficiently allocate
resources (p. 9002).”
IV.  Measuring the Change in Productive Efficiency
Whether the desirable properties of incentive regulation are realized is an
empirical issue. What will be examined is whether incentive regulation in the
form of price caps has resulted in an improvement in productive efficiency.
The focus will be incumbent local exchange carriers. It is not a straightforward
exercise, however, to measure the change in productive efficiency. First, LECs
are involved in three different markets where they produce identifiable outputs
including local service, intrastate toll/access service, and interstate access to
local loops. Incentive regulation, however, is applicable only to interstate
access (both common line and traffic sensitive switched access).
3 The
measurement problem arises because it is not possible to apportion accurately
inputs among the three separate services produced. Hence, using LEC data
and if incentive regulation has changed productive efficiency, it will be possible
to evaluate the relative change but it is not possible to indicate the absolute
3 Interstate access service has grown much more rapidly on average than demand for local
service and intrastate toll/access service. The data on this are clear. Thus, in the presence of
economies of density, there is every reason to expect that productivity enhancements
experienced historically in the interstate access market would be substantially greater than
the overall rate of productivity growth experienced by LECs in supplying all services
(Shin and Ying (1993)). Most of the productivity growth experienced in the
telecommunications industry is related to reductions in switching costs and to savings in
transmissions costs which occur as a result of using electronics to expand the carrying
capacity of transmissions facilities. In contrast productivity growth in supplying loop services
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magnitude of that change as applicable to interstate access service to local
loops.
Productivity is just the ratio of output to input. Productivity changes due
to differences in production technology, differences in the efficiency of the
production process, and differences in the environment in which production
takes place. The problem is to attribute productivity variation to these sources
and an unattributed residual -Abramovitz's (1956) famous “measure of our
ignorance.” Solow (1957) sought to attribute output growth to input growth
and technical change by distinguishing movements along a production frontier
from shifts in the frontier.  Economies of scale were added to the explanation
by Brown and Popkin (1962). David and van de Klundert (1965) allowed
technical change to be biased. The effects of scale economies and technical
change on productivity growth were translated into their effects on productions
costs by Ohta (1974) and Binswanger (1974). Only Nishimizu and Page
(1982), who decomposed productivity into shifts in the production frontier
and movements toward or away from it, attempted to incorporate efficiency
change into a model of productivity change.
In the analysis designed to measure productive efficiency, there are two
commonly used approaches -the econometric approach and the data
envelopment analysis approach.
4 The econometric approach to incorporating
efficiency change into a model of productivity growth began with the stochastic
frontier production function, proposed independently by Aigner et al. (1977)
and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977).  In a deterministic frontier production
function setting, deviations from the production frontier might not be entirely
under the control of the firm being studied.  Random equipment failures, for
example, might appear as inefficiency.  Additionally, any error or imperfection
in the specification of the model could translate into an increase in the measure
of inefficiency. The stochastic frontier production function postulates the
4 These two approaches are sometimes referred to as the parametric and the nonparametric
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existence of technical inefficiencies of production of firms involved in
producing a particular good or service. The amount by which a firm lies below
its production frontier is regarded as a measure of inefficiency.  The approach
begins with a cross-sectional translog cost function and a system of input
share equations with technical and allocative inefficiency allowed. Technical
change is incorporated into the specification by adding time as an argument
in the cost function and the share equations. The computational burden,
however, is great.  In theory, however, the specification does allow productivity
change as reflected by a change in the cost function to occur as a result of
scale economies, technical change, and changes in technical and allocative
efficiency. Additionally, while the parametric approach can deal with multiple
inputs, it does not allow for multiple outputs (Greene (1993)). The approach
does allow, however, for the determination of the impact of specific factors
(e.g., research and development expenditures) on productive efficiency. This
is not the case with the data envelopment analysis approach. Shin and Ying
(1993), among others, illustrate the use of this econometric approach in an
application to the telecommunications industry.
An alternative approach to measuring productive efficiency is the
mathematical programming approach known as data envelopment analysis
(DEA). Drawing on the work of Debreu (1951) and Koopmans (1951), Farrell
(1957) argued that it is practical to measure productive efficiency based on a
production possibility set consisting of the conical hull of input-output vectors.
This framework was generalized to multiple outputs and reformulated as a
mathematical programming problem by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978).
The DEA approach does not require any assumptions about the functional
form, in contrast to the econometric approach. DEA, however, is non-stochastic
which suggests that random variation in the data can potentially impact the
efficiency measure. Efficiency in a given time period is measured relative to
all other time periods with the simple restriction that production of each output
in each time period lie on or below the efficient frontier. It is the approach
that will be used here.171 TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY, ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY
In the programming method, DEA “floats a piecewise linear surface to
rest on the top of the observations (Seiford and Thrall, 1990, p.8).” The facets
of the hyperplane define the efficiency frontier, and the degree of inefficiency
is quantified and partitioned by a series of metrics that measure various
distances from the hyperplane and its facets (Leibenstein and Maital, 1992).
V.  A Brief Description of DEA
The objective is to determine the relative efficiency for each year.
Efficiency is measured by the ratio of inputs to outputs. For multiple outputs
and inputs, the appropriate efficiency index is that of summed weighted
outputs, divided by summed weighted inputs (Fare et al. (1994)).
Assume that there are K inputs and M outputs for each of N time periods.
For time period i, these are represented by vectors x
i and y
i, respectively. The
K X N input matrix, X, and the M X N output matrix, Y, represent data for all
N time periods.
The mathematical programming formulation of the efficiency problem
asks what output and input weights would optimize efficiency. That is, the
problem is given as
minimize
q, l q                                                                                              (1)
subject to
-y
i + Yl ‡ 0,
qx
i - Xl ‡ 0,
N1'l = 1, and
l ‡ 0172 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
where N1 is an N X 1 vector of ones, q is a scalar, and l is an N X 1 vector of
weights or scale variables.
5 The value of q is the efficiency score for time
period i. It will satisfy q £ 1, with a value of 1 indicating a point on the
frontier and hence technical efficiency. Note that the linear programming
problem must be solved N times, once for each time period in the sample.  A
value of q is obtained for each time period.
DEA can be specified as either an output-maximizing problem or an input-
minimizing problem. Moreover, each DEA specification has a dual. DEA
provides a set of scalar measures of efficiency. These measures come in pairs,
one set for the input-oriented problem and one set for the output-oriented
problem.
As proposed by Farrell,
6 the two primary scalar measures of efficiency for
the input-oriented problem are
(1) Technical efficiency (TE) which is just the proportional reduction in
inputs possible for a given level of output in order to obtain the efficient input
use,
7 and
(2) Allocative efficiency (AE) which reflects the ability of the firm to use
the inputs in optimal proportions, given their respective prices.
The two measures can be combined to give a measure of total economic
efficiency. It is the product of the two efficiency measures.
DEA makes no a priori distinction between the relative importance of
any combination of outputs or inputs. While DEA is nonparametric, this does
5 The fact that the weights sum to 1 indicates that a piecewise linear production surface can
exhibit increasing, constant, or decreasing returns-to-scale.
6  Some of Farrell's terminology differs from that used here.  He used the term price efficiency
instead of allocative efficiency and the term overall efficiency instead of economic efficiency.
The terminology used here conforms to that customarily found in the literature on DEA.
7 TE measures only that portion of inefficiency that could be eliminated by proportional
reduction of inputs. It is the proximity of the data point (yr, xi) to the facet of the piecewise
linear envelopment surface. Even after reducing input use by (1 - TE), however, some
inputs may still exhibit slack (i.e., be used inefficiently).173 TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY, ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY
not imply that it is not based on underlying economic theory. Thus, for example,
assumptions about the underlying technology will determine whether the
efficient frontier is forced through the origin (implying constant returns to
scale (CRS))
8 or allowed not to pass through the origin (implying variable
returns to scale (VRS)). The CRS assumption is appropriate only when
production is optimal (i.e., corresponding to the flat portion of the long run
average cost curve). A number of factors including, for example, imperfect
competition or regulation may cause suboptimal production. The use of the
CRS specification when production is not at the optimal level will result in
measures of technical efficiency which are confounded by scale efficiencies
(Ali and Seiford, 1993). The use of the VRS specification, as is done here,
permits the calculation of technical efficiencies devoid of these scale efficiency
effects.
9
To measure both technical and allocative efficiency, it is necessary to have
price information on the inputs and be willing to assume that cost minimization
is the objective.
10
Assuming variable returns to scale and cost minimization, technical
efficiencies would first be obtained by solving the problem given in (1). Next,





*                                                                                     (2)
subject to
-y
i + Yl ‡ 0,
8 The original formulation in Charnes et al. (1978) assumed constant returns to scale (CRS).
Subsequent formulations, e.g., Banker et al. (1984), permit variable returns to scale.
9 The variable returns to scale formulation of the problem can be converted to a constant
returns to scale problem by deleting the convexity constraint, N1'l = 1.
10 Note that is also possible to assume revenue maximization as the objective. See, e.g.,
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qx
i - Xl ‡ 0,
N1'l = 1, and
l ‡ 0
where w
i is a vector of input prices for time period i and x 
i
* (which is calculated
by the linear program) is the cost-minimizing vector of input quantities for
time period i, given the prices, w
i and the output levels, y
i.






This is just the ratio of minimum cost to observed cost.
This is the methodology that will be used in assessing whether incentive
regulation in the form of price caps has had any demonstrable impact on the
technical efficiency and the allocative efficiency of LECs. Before
implementing the approach, a discussion of the data is in order.
VI.  Data Issues
Measurement of technical efficiency and allocative efficiency of LECs is
based on the LECs regulated books of account excluding miscellaneous
services. Thus, the measurement is based on the productivity of all LEC
activities including local service, intrastate toll/access service, and interstate
access to local loops. The measurement is for the period 1985 through 1998.
Just the Regional Bell Operating Companies are considered.
11 In 1998 the
11 The Regional Bell Operating Companies are holding companies. Each Regional Bell
Operating Company owns two or more Bell Operating Companies. Currently, the four Bell
Operating Companies consist of the following LECs: Illinois Bell Telephone Company,
Indiana Bell Telephone Company, Michigan Bell Telephone Company, The Ohio Bell
Telephone Company, Wisconsin Bell, Inc., Bell Atlantic - Delaware, Inc., Bell Atlantic -
Maryland, Bell Atlantic - New England Telephone and Telegraph Company, Bell Atlantic
- New Jersey, Inc., Bell Atlantic - New York Telephone Company, Bell Atlantic -
Pennsylvania, Inc., Bell Atlantic - Virginia, Inc., Bell Atlantic - Washington, DC, Inc.,175 TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY, ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY
Regional Bell Operating Companies accounted for 79.4 percent of total
common carrier revenue and 82.9 percent of local network revenue (Federal
Communications Commission, 1998). All of the LECs included in the analysis
are subject to price caps previously discussed.
12
A.  Output Measures
Three separate measures of output are used in the analysis - local service,
intrastate toll/access service, and interstate service. Local service volume is
measured by the number of local dial equipment minutes. State toll and
intrastate service volume is measured by dial equipment minutes as well.
These data are taken from the Federal Communications Commission's
Monitoring Reports. An interstate quantity index to measure interstate service
is constructed using the physical measures of three services including the
number of access lines, the number of interstate switched access minutes,
and the number of interstate special access lines. The number of access lines
is measured by the sum of the number of business, public, and residential
access lines. The data on the number of special access lines, the number of
business access lines, residential access lines, and public access lines are
taken from the Federal Communications Commission's  Statistics of
Communications Common Carriers for 1985 through 1998. Interstate switched
access minutes are from the Federal Communication Commission's Monitoring
Reports.
Bell Atlantic - West Virginia, Inc., BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., Nevada Bell,
Pacific Bell, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, and U.S. West Communications,
Inc. These LECs correspond closely to the original local phone companies that the Justice
Department divested from AT&T in 1984.
12 Other price cap LECs include Aliant (AllTel) Communications Company, Cincinnati
Bell Telephone Company, Citizens Telecommunications Company, Frontier Telephone of
Rochester, GTE, and Sprint Local. These LECs are excluded from the analysis because the
requisite data are not available for the entire historical period 1985-1998.176 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
A service's share of total interstate revenue is used to weigh each service
in the construction of the measure of interstate output. That is, the number of
access lines is weighted by the End User Common Line revenue share of
total interstate revenues. The number of switched access minutes is weighted
by the switched access revenue share, and the number of special access lines
is weighted by the special access revenue share. A Fisher Ideal Quantity Index
is then constructed (Fisher, 1922).
13 The composite Fisher Ideal Interstate
Quantity (Output) Index is derived by chaining the Fisher Interstate Ideal
Output Index.
B.  Input Quantity Measures
Three separate inputs are considered -labor, capital, and materials. The
measure of the quantity labor is based on annual accounting data for the number
of employees from the Federal Communications Commission's Statistics of
Communications Common Carriers. Since there is no objective way to account
for the contribution of part-time versus full-time employees, just the total
13 The Fisher Ideal Index is the geometric average of the Laspeyres Index and the Paasche
Index.  This index is desirable because it is calculated using the weights of adjacent years.
During periods of relatively substantial and significant changes in prices, a significant bias
can appear in fixed weight measures, even during periods close to the base period.
Expanding beyond just two periods, a chained Fisher Ideal Quantity Index can be constructed
between periods 0 and t. It is the product of each of the Fisher Ideal Quantity Indexes
between periods 0 and t. All input and output quantity indexes are chained Fisher Ideal
Quantity Indexes. The chained Fisher Ideal Quantity Index addresses one of the most
fundamental problems in measuring output -the choice of the base period with which all
other periods are compared.  Since changes in the Fisher Ideal Quantity Index are calculated
using weights of adjacent years, the chaining of the annual changes allows for the effect of
changes in relative prices. Thus, the Fisher Ideal Chained Quantity Index calculates an
index that is appropriate for each period and avoids having to update a fixed-weight index.
It also negates the substitution bias that is inherent in a fixed-weight index. Finally, the
chain-type index provides a more accurate measure of current period output during periods
of significant price changes.177 TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY, ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY
number of employees is used as the labor input measure. This, however, does
not introduce a substantial bias in the labor quantity measure since part-time
employees accounted for less that 0.7 percent of the workforce in 1998.
The capital input quantity index series is computed by dividing current
period capital stock by the base period capital stock. The capital stock is
computed based on the perpetual inventory method (Goldsmith, 1951).
14
The materials quantity is computed as materials expense divided by a
materials price index. Materials expense is a residual. It is the difference
between total operating expense and the sum of labor compensation and
depreciation and amortization expense. The materials price index comes from
the Input/Output Tables compiled by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the
U.S. Department of Commerce.
C.  Price Indexes
In order to correct the miscalculation common in productivity studies
intended to be used in a regulatory setting, it is necessary to replace the
productivity study's imputed cost of capital with a competitive cost for the
inputs during the historical years.  To do so requires the adoption of a surrogate
to emulate a competitive cost of capital for LECs because LECs have never
operated in a competitive market.  An independent price series is employed
to compute the annual change in the cost of capital for a competitive market.
Specifically, Moody's Baa corporate bond rate reported in the 1999 Economic
Report of the President (Table B-73) is used to calculate the adjustment
(Council of Economic Advisors (1999)).
15 Combining the base year imputed
14 Just a single capital measure is considered. This is based primarily on the nature of the
capital data that are available and its level of disaggregation. The interested reader is referred
to the deliberations in CC Docket No. 94-1 accessible via the Federal Communications
Commission web site.
15 Any index for a competitively determined cost of capital should be acceptable because
changes in the cost of capital in competitive markets are similar across markets. The use of a178 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
cost of capital with the change in the competitive cost of capital gives an
independent competitive cost of capital for LECs in each year of the historical
period.
16
The materials price index is based on those categories of expenditures
from the National Input-Output Tables compiled by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce that focus on materials
purchases by communications industries. The materials price index is a
Tornqvist index. Total labor compensation divided by the number of employees
gives a simple way of computing the average annual price of labor.
Finally, all prices are in real terms. They are deflated by the gross domestic
product price index (GDP-PI).
A cursory examination of the data reveal some interesting trends. Local
service output shows a much more rapid increase beginning in 1994 than it
had previously. Between 1985 and 1994, local service output grew at an annual
average rate of 2.2 percent. Subsequently, it has grown at a 6.4 annual
percentage rate. This is attributed to an increase in Internet traffic.  Interstate
service output is the most rapidly growing component of LECs' activities,
averaging 6.1 percent per year.
different series would yield comparable results given the competitive nature of financial
markets. For example, the correlation over the period 1985-1998 between Moody's Aaa
corporate bond rate and the Baa rate used is 0.99.  Analogously, the correlation between the
10-year U.S. Treasury securities rate and the 30-year U.S. Treasury securities rate and Moody's
Baa rate over the same period is 0.99 and 0.98, respectively.  In terms of changes in the
absolute level of the series, the correlation between Moody's Baa corporate bond rate and
Moody's Aaa corporate bond rate, the 10-year U.S. Treasury securities rate, and the 30-year
U.S. Treasury securities rate over the period 1985-1998 is 0.99, 0.98, and 0.97, respectively.
16 The base year is 1991. This is the first full year of LEC price caps. The implicit assumption
is that the cost of capital for this year was at the competitive level. That is, it is assumed
that LECs earned a normal return in that year.  In fact immediately prior to the implementation
of price caps in 1991, the Federal Communications Commissions computed a competitive
rate of return of 11.25 percent (Matter of Represcribing the Authorized Rate of Return for
Interstate Service for Local Exchange Carriers, Order, CC Docket Number 89-624, 5 FCC
Rcd 7507, 7532.)  In 1991, LECs on average earned an 11.25 percent rate of return (ARMIS
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On the input side, labor input fell by 3.6 percent per year. Between 1985
and 1998, the price of labor increased in real terms at a 3.6 percent annual
rate. In terms of total compensation, the amount paid for labor was
approximately the same in 1985 as it was in 1998 even though the number of
workers in the aggregate had been reduced. The reason for this, at least in
part, is that, coincident with the adoption of price cap plans, labor force
reductions were accomplished by offering employees monetary incentives to
leave the company (i.e., buyouts). There is some variability in the applicable
accounting rules,
17 but these payments were generally accrued as one-time
charges against current earnings (Kridel et al., 1996).
There is an identifiable increase in the capital input quantity beginning in
1996. This is due primarily to relatively large increases in investment in both
central office switching equipment and cable and wire facilities. Finally,
reflecting financial market conditions, the cost of capital exhibits a decline
over the historical period.
VII. Measuring Technical Efficiency and Allocative Efficiency
of LECs
Data envelopment analysis with a cost minimizing objective and assuming
variable returns to scale is used to compute the technical efficiency and
allocative efficiency of LECs over the 1985 to 1998 period.
18  The results are
presented in Table 1.
The results are fairly revealing with regard to both technical efficiency
and allocative efficiency. For technical efficiency there is a definite randomness
between 1985 and 1993 with technical efficiency increasing in some years
and decreasing in other years. (Recall that the performance for any given
year is relative to the best observed practice which occurs in 1998.) Subsequent
17 See, e.g., Financial Accounting Standards Board Rule (FASB) Number 106.
18 The problem is solved using the Data Envelopment Analysis Program (Coelli, 1996).180 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
19 Frame relay services employ a form of packet switching. The packets are in the form of
frames which are variable in length.
20 Asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) is a high bandwidth, low-delay, connection- oriented,
packet-like switching and multiplexing technique.
Table 1. Technical Efficiency and Allocative Summary for LECs
Year Technical Allocative Total Economic
Efficiency Efficiency Efficiency
1
1985 0.902 0.557 0.502
1986 0.872 0.588 0.513
1987 0.904 0.594 0.537
1988 0.884 0.641 0.567
1989 0.930 0.660 0.613
1990 0.948 0.695 0.658
1991 0.930 0.748 0.696
1992 0.926 0.767 0.710
1993 0.918 0.802 0.736
1994 0.931 0.867 0.807
1995 0.955 0.921 0.880
1996 0.984 0.965 0.950
1997 0.988 0.991 0.980
1998 1.000 1.000 1.000
1 Total economic efficiency equals technical efficiency times allocative efficiency.
to 1993, however, there is a consistent improvement in technical efficiency.
This is due primarily to relatively large increases in investment in both central
office switching equipment and cable and wire facilities. In the case of
switching equipment, major investments were made, for example, in frame
relays
19 and ATM.
20 For cable and wire facilities, substantial investments were181 TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY, ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY
made in optical fiber.
21 The increase in the demand for access to the Internet
as well as the need by businesses to transfer large amounts of data have driven
the growth in investment designed to transfer higher levels of bandwidth at
faster rates (Telecommunications Industry Association, 2000). Additionally,
given that incentive regulation in the form of price caps was implemented for
LECs in 1991, it is likely that some portion of this consistent improvement in
technical efficiency subsequent to 1993 is attributable to incentive regulation.
A pronounced upward trend in allocative efficiency is observed beginning
in 1985, the beginning of the sample period. Hence, it is more problematic than
it is for technical efficiency to attribute the improvement in allocative efficiency
to the adoption of incentive regulation in the form of price caps. It is more likely
an artifact of the divestiture of AT&T although some indeterminant portion is
probably associated with the implementation of price caps.
VIII. Comparison
How do the results obtained here compare with similar studies of industries
subject to incentive regulation? Unfortunately, there is a dearth of studies that
specifically look at the productivity impact of incentive regulation in the
telecommunications industry.
22 There are just a few such studies. Tardiff and
Taylor (1993) test whether incentive regulation affects the rate of total factor
productivity growth over time. Measuring total factor productivity using the
conventional growth accounting approach,
23 they pool cross-section and time
series data over the period 1984 to 1990 for large LECs in the United States.
21 Fiber optics is a technology whereby electrical signals are converted into optical signals
that are transported through glass fiber and then reconverted by receivers at the other end
into electrical signals.
22 A generic review of studies on the effects of incentive regulation is provided by Kridel et
al. (1996).
23 Uri (2000) examines the shortcomings associated with using the conventional growth
accounting approach for total factor productivity in the telecommunications industry.182 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
They conclude that incentive regulation increases annual productivity growth
by about 2.8 percent. This increase in productivity is driven equally by higher
output and lower input growth. Tardiff and Taylor also find that LECs that
operate under incentive regulation are able to produce the same output with
about 6 percent less labor than LECs that do not operate under incentive
regulation.
The other study that explicitly looks at the effect of incentive regulation on
LEC productivity is that by Majumdar (1997).
24 Using data envelopment
analysis based on three outputs and three inputs for the period 1988 to 1993,
25
Majumdar finds that price caps plans as a replacement for rate of return
regulation has a marginally statistically significant positive, but lagged, effect
on the technical efficiency of local exchange carriers. It is claimed that the
impact of price caps on scale efficiency are positive, although the reported results
are only marginally statistically significant. For neither technical efficiency nor
scale efficiency are the effects of price caps on productivity quantified.
IX. Conclusion
Incentive regulation in the form of price caps is now an important regulatory
tool in the telecommunications industry in the United States. The objective
of incentive regulation is to improve productive efficiency, enhance service
24 This study is an update of Majumdar (1995).
25 The outputs consist of the number of local calls, the number of intrastate toll calls, and
the number of interstate calls. There are significant limitations associated with these output
measures and discussed in Appendix B (The 1999 Staff TFP Study by Noel D. Uri) in
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 94-1, Released November 15,
1999. The major problem is that they do not accurately portray the growth in LEC output.
Inputs consist of switches, number of lines, and number of employees. These measures of
inputs also suffer limitations because they do not account for all LEC inputs. A extended
discussion of the appropriate output and input measures to use in measuring LEC
productivity can be found in Comments and Reply Comments to CC Docket No. 94-1 filed
in January 2000. These, as noted previously, can be accessed via the Federal
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quality and consumer welfare, and reduce the costs of regulation. The issue
that has been explored here is whether incentive regulation in the form of a
price cap applicable to interstate access service to local loops has resulted in
an increase in the technical efficiency and allocative efficiency of local
exchange carriers.
After discussing the reasons for adopting incentive regulation, the nature
of price caps is explored followed by an overview of the methodology for
measuring the effects of incentive regulation on productive efficiency. This
methodology is data envelopment analysis and allows for the measurement
of both technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. A discussion of the
data on the three output measures and three input measures for the period
1985-1998 is subsequently provided.
The results indicate that for technical efficiency, there is a definite
randomness between 1985 and 1993 with technical efficiency increasing in
some years and decreasing in other years. Subsequent to 1993, however, there
is a consistent improvement in technical efficiency. Given that incentive
regulation in the form of price caps was implemented for LECs in 1991, it is
likely that some portion of the improvement in technical efficiency subsequent
to 1993 is attributable to incentive regulation.
A pronounced upward trend in allocative efficiency is observed beginning
in 1985.  It is problematic, however, to attribute the improvement in allocative
efficiency to the adoption of incentive regulation in the form of price caps. It is
more likely an artifact of the divestiture of AT&T although some indeterminant
portion is probably associated with the implementation of price caps.
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